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Indigenous tribes, states, and foreign sovereigns possess different degrees of sovereignty 
outside the federal government yet frequently interact within the United States’ judicial system. 
In their presence in the Supreme Court, do indigenous tribes behave more like foreign sovereigns 
or more like states? I explore how each actor behaves as a submitter of amicus curiae briefs in 
order to compare the macro-level behavior of tribes, sovereigns, and states. I analyze the amicus 
brief submissions of these actors to all merits cases throughout the Roberts Court. My dataset is 
unique in the attention paid to the network of signees and entities involved in each amicus brief: 
I record all entities co-signing on to a single brief and compare the patterns within and between 
the entities in how frequently they file, to which party they file for, and with whom entities co-
file. Through analyzing my dataset of briefs and beginning to evaluate the network compilation 
of signees, I demonstrate that tribes’ behavior as amicus submitters lies in between that of states 
and foreign sovereigns, mirroring the state of their semi-sovereignty in the eyes of the Supreme 
Court. 
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Introduction 
 Indigenous tribes’1 sovereignty is incomplete; they exist in a state of jurisdictional limbo. 
In making this claim, sovereignty is defined as the authority to self-govern (NCAI Policy 
Research Center 2012, 4). As the relationship between the United States and indigenous tribes 
currently stands, tribal nations possess powers of self-governance while simultaneously 
remaining limited. In the wake of recent high-profile decisions perceived as impinging on tribal 
sovereignty (Carcieri v. Salazar 2009 555 U.S. __; Duro v. Reina 1990 495 U.S. 676), tribal 
nations have vocalized their struggles to adjudicate within a fluctuating state of quasi-
sovereignty. This state creates a “patchwork of various federal and tribal laws that work in 
tandem to utterly obfuscate justice” (Deer 2015, 31). Indigenous tribes are frequently required to 
work within the United States legal system in order to retain their self-governance due to the 
complex nature of their relationship with the United States. The Supreme Court regularly 
evaluates indigenous tribes’ sovereignty and the importance of cultivating a presence within the 
Court to advocate for an actor’s interest has grown significantly. Prior to this research, there has 
been no comprehensive evaluation comparing the manner in which indigenous tribes advocate 
for their interests to the lobbying actions of other sovereign entities within the Court. 
Current research acknowledges the rise of lobbying strategies before the Court but 
provides little evidence of how actors lobby; without a baseline understanding of how, the 
impacts of lobbying efforts are unable to be accurately measured. Amicus curiae briefs are 
intentionally submitted legal briefs which play key roles in decision-making processes within the 
Supreme Court. These briefs are intended to promulgate the views of the submitting actors 
                                                      
1 I use the term “indigenous tribe” to refer to Native American tribal communities and tribal nations within the 
United States. This research is limited by the confines of my perspective as a researcher of settler origins. To this 
end, I measure behavior through observable statistics and take great care not to take ownership of the complex 
histories affecting each indigenous tribe.  
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(Krislov 1963) and are carefully coordinated to impact the decisions of the Court (Gleason 2017; 
Collins 2008). Organizations such as the Tribal Supreme Court Project, the National Association 
of Attorneys General Center for Supreme Court Advocacy, and the Supreme Court Project 
coordinate brief-writing efforts and facilitate communication throughout interest groups with 
shared priorities. The rise of these organizations within the past few decades demonstrates 
national recognition of the lasting impact of the Court’s decisions and the importance of pooling 
resources in order to lobby the Court for desired outcomes most successfully. While it is 
accepted that these organizations have greatly improved the quality of amici contributed by 
actors (Fletcher 2010, 517; Labin 2002, 696; Clayton 1994, 542), there is very little known about 
the mechanisms of the coordination techniques and how actors’ amici submissions differ based 
on their varying impetuses for coordination. Frequently, amicus curiae research pays more 
attention to how the Court considers submissions rather than how submitters consider their 
presence in the Court. By looking at the behavior of the actors rather than the Court, we begin to 
understand how interest groups conceptualize their relationship with the Court and, by extension, 
the how they visualize the Courts as an effective arena in which to pursue justice. Through 
tracing the amici coordination strategies of indigenous tribes, states, and foreign sovereigns, I 
depict the overall behavior of each actor and, most critically, lay the foundation of descriptive 
analyses for understanding why each actor behaves as they do.  
The heart of my argument is that an entity’s type changes their amici-submitting 
behavior; an indigenous tribe will submit amici in a distinct manner due to their different 
relationship with the federal government. The theory that different groups submit in different 
ways is upheld within the literature (Hansford 2004, Caldeira and Wright 1990, Collins and 
Solowiej 2007). Uneven research on institutional interest groups makes it difficult to understand 
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how different actors, with different degrees of sovereignty, behave within the Supreme Court. 
My research question targets this relationship between actor sovereignty and amici submission 
behavior, asking whether indigenous tribes behave more like foreign sovereigns or more like 
states. I focus on the behavior of the actors themselves rather than attempting to isolate the 
implications of actor behavior and further narrow in scope by focusing on descriptive patterns of 
behavior. The behavior of amici actors on the whole is significantly under-researched. Before we 
can accurately estimate the effect of amici on judicial decision making, we need to know more 
about the descriptive patterns of amici submission. I define the broad term of “behavior” as how 
frequently, in favor of which party, and with whom actors file amicus briefs.  
As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (1997, 1) emphasized, “whether tribal court, state court, 
or federal court, we must all strive to make the dispensation of justice in this country as fair, 
efficient, and principled as we can.” The knowledge of how tribal nations are working towards 
equal dispensation of justice is limited by the lack of understanding of how indigenous tribes act 
as lobbying forces in their amicus curiae briefs. Amicus curiae briefs are instances in which 
indigenous tribes are voluntarily presenting the Court with information. By investigating 
submission behavior, I contribute an understanding of how indigenous tribes compare to other 
sovereign actors in how they treat the Court as a venue in which to evoke change. 
 In this paper, I first review the literature on amicus curiae briefs in general, followed by 
the research on indigenous tribes, states, and foreign sovereigns in the Court. My literature 
review closes with a discussion of the research on how actors behave as amici submitters and the 
lobbying strategies they employ within the Court. Next, I present my hypotheses on the actors’ 
amici submission behavior as based in my theory of their strategy. I subsequently explain my 
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dependent variable classification, data collection, and statistical processes. Following my 
explanation of the structure of my study, I discuss my findings for each hypothesis and 
qualitatively support what the data depict for certain relationships. Finally, in light of my 
findings, I draw conclusions and identify possible extensions of this topic in social network 
analysis.  
Literature Review 
The minimal literature available discussing indigenous tribes’ amicus curiae focuses only 
on amici in cases regarding federal Indian law rather than analyzing the behavior and treatment 
of tribal nations as submitters across all case types.  My research asks whether the behavior of 
indigenous tribes as submitters of amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court is more like that of 
foreign sovereigns or states. How do indigenous tribes compare to states and foreign sovereigns 
as submitters of amicus curiae? 
In order to answer my overarching question comparing the behavior of these three actors, 
I first outline the general discussion on amicus curiae within the Supreme Court. Subsequently, I 
analyze the understanding of how tribes, states, and foreign sovereigns behave in the Court – I 
address the research on these actors in the Court overall and finally target the research on the 
actors’ three behavioral qualities in which I am interested. As there is significant research 
missing for indigenous tribes, I theorize expected behavior for this actor based on the known 
behavior of states and foreign sovereigns and on the limited information available regarding 
amici in federal Indian law.  
Amicus Curiae Research At-Large 
Amicus curiae, or “friend of the court” briefs, are briefs submitted to either side of a 
Supreme Court docket. These briefs are meant to lend a previously unrepresented perspective in 
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regards to the details or context of a case before the Court and are typically submitted in favor of 
either the petitioner or respondent. The rules concerning amicus curiae are outlined in Supreme 
Court Rule 37. For each brief, the Court mandates proper methods for submission and the 
appropriate “content, format, and circumstances” (Legal Information Institute “Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure”). Amici briefs garner a significant amount of attention within the political 
science and legal communities as there is disagreement as to how amici evoke change within 
case decisions, and to what extent.  
Justices Black, Breyer, and Scalia highlight the critical role amicus curiae play in 
extending the justices’ perspectives and knowledge concerning cases.  In a dissent in Jaffe v. 
Redmond in 1996, Justice Scalia noted a disparity in amicus briefs submitted by the parties and 
suggested an impact in decision making because of this (518 U.S. 1 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). Further outlining the importance of amicus curiae, Justice Black stated he disliked 
“the almost insuperable obstacles” that Supreme Court Rule 37 creates for amici submissions as 
they impede individuals seeking to contribute information in a case to which they are not a party. 
According to Justice Black, a wide range of amici is critical as “most of the cases before this 
Court involve matters that affect far more people than the immediate record parties” (346 U.S. 
946 (1954)). Justice Black’s statement emphasizes the importance of the Court as a venue in 
which decisions affect far more than the two parties involved. In order to understand truly the 
ramifications of a case beyond the two parties involved, varied input is crucial in decision-
making. Justice Breyer discussed the utility of amicus briefs as filling voids in knowledge during 
cases that rely heavily on scientifically based evidence (Breyer 1998). Through this, Justice 
Breyer underlines how amici inform the justices beyond the abilities of either party to do so. 
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Amici, in Justice Breyer’s reasoning, allow the Court to come to an informed decision on cases 
that intersect with specialties other than the law. 
Amicus curiae submission rates skyrocketed at the latter end of the twentieth century and 
from this increase grew research attempting to ascertain the extent to which an amicus brief can 
impact judicial decision-making. Amici were submitted to an average of 10% of cases at the 
beginning of the twentieth century; by the end, 85% of cases had at least one amicus curiae 
submitted (Bradly and Gardner 1985; Kearney and Merrill 2000, 753). Currently, amicus filings 
reach unprecedented heights (Larsen 2014). Scholars of the Court share a common interest in 
isolating and understanding the many variables that affect the justices and in turn impact case 
outcomes (Baum 1997, Frank 1963). As amici submission rates rose, scholars saw a need to 
evaluate the extent of the impact of these briefs on case decisions ((Krislov 1963, Puro 1971, 
Kearney and Merrill 2000, 751). From this need grew the overwhelming focus within amicus 
curiae literature on determining the effect of groups’ submissions on the Court’s decisions – I 
label this variable as “amici effectiveness.” Amici effectiveness has been examined time and 
time again with varying methods of measurement. Litigant success rate (Kearney and Merrill 
2000, Songer and Sheehan 1993) and citation rate, or the rate at which a brief is cited within the 
Court’s opinions, are two commonly utilized measures (Collins 2004a). More recently, Collins 
(2008) incorporated justice-vote directionality, or measuring effectiveness based on how certain 
justices vote for cases to which certain interest groups submit. Litigation success rate, citation 
rate, and vote directionality all attempt to assess the effectiveness of amici on the justices. As 
evidenced by the changing standards of measure, amici effectiveness is notoriously difficult to 
isolate, yet it is valued as it is part of the larger structure of forces impacting judicial decisions.  
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 A significant amount of amicus curiae research focuses on the interplay of “interest 
groups” within the Court; my research is in line with precedent by labelling indigenous tribes, 
states, and foreign sovereigns as a type of institutional interest groups. There are various methods 
of classifying interest groups within amicus curiae research (Caldeira and Wright 1990; Collins 
and Solowiej 2007; Collins 2008). Generally, “interest groups” are defined in this literature as all 
organized groups representing the interests of more than one individual. The title of “interest 
groups” is a broad category that encompasses actors with varying institutional functions (ex.: 
states, private corporations, non-profit organization). As interest groups, these actors typically 
seek to work on behalf of their interests to sway policy or legal outcomes in a desired direction. 
Previous research has analyzed the impacts of actors with varying interest groups subcategories 
across a broad-range of studies. The framework set by Caldeira and Wright (1990) for 
classifying interest groups has four separate classifications for portions of the United States 
government: United States, state, county, municipality and other. All non-United States 
institutional entities are relegated to the category of “Other” and are combined with different 
actors, many of whom are not structured in comparable institutional formats. This method allows 
for thorough analysis of certain submitters but ignores significant differences in the actors 
relegated to the rank of “other.” While this shows precedent for including state actors within a 
definition of “interest group,” it severely restricts opportunities to compare the behavior of 
institutional actors. More recently, authors have eliminated institutional actors from their 
analyses all together. Box-Steffensmeier (2014) and Gibson (1997) are in the minority of 
researchers in excluding actors representing government interests, or “institutional interest 
groups” (Caldeira and Wright 1990), when looking at interest group activity within the courts. 
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These deviations from the norm preclude the possibility of understanding the important function 
which actors representing their citizens’, rather than merely members’, interests play.  
I limit my analyses to indigenous tribes, states, and foreign sovereigns as to target three 
types of interest groups with comparable motivations. While structurally distinct, all three actor 
types represent the interests of a group of citizens rather than non-democratically-bound 
membership organizations. My independent variable is actor type – I seek to more accurately 
probe the amici behavioral differences between governmental actors and to fill a currently 
incomplete understanding of how institutional interest groups act as submitters of amici and how 
an institution’s degree of self-governance impacts their behavior. The existing literature tends to 
pay more attention to charting the behavior of membership-based groups rather than 
government-based groups and this oversight results in a lack of information on how institutional 
actors submit as compared to membership-based groups. Caldeira and Wainwright (1990, 789) 
posit that institutional interest groups enjoy greater freedom in their amici submission behavior 
due to the absence of a membership framework. Nevertheless, this greater freedom is currently 
uncharted. I am interested in how sovereignty, or institutional separation from the Court, impacts 
the manner in which actors behave within the Court. 
Amicus briefs are lobbying mechanisms – they are intentionally submitted in favor of 
certain interests and with certain parties. The emergence of lobbying strategies within the judicial 
branch is by no means a novel claim (Barker 1967), yet still necessitates systematic evaluation at 
a large scale as the literature is missing the behavioral details needed in order to make claims as 
to the extent and impact of lobbying within the Courts. While well-defended within the literature, 
the claim that amici are strategically submitted in order to further actors’ interests is significant 
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as it represents the change in nature of an institutional mechanism. Gone is the pure, original 
intent of amicus briefs: to act as information-gathering agents informing the Court as a friend 
(Rustad and Koenig 1993, 91). Hansford (2004) stipulates that amicus curiae are intentional as 
they are stimulated by the desire to increase influence policy changes in the direction that an 
actor desires.  Amicus briefs are thereby meaningful; signing a brief illustrates the position 
which a group supports and emphasizes the shared interests of a coalition (Box-Steffensmeier 
2014). Furthermore, there is a plethora of manners in which they go about advocacy (Krislov 
1963). One manner of orchestrating advocacy is deciding with whom to sign. Interest groups 
tactically organize, or form coalitions, to better portray their interests within the United States 
government, and vary these tactics based on the actors they work with (Victor 2007, Hula 1999). 
Different groups have different levels of wealth, status, and credibility, which prior work 
suggests plays a key role in determining the recognition an organized interest group obtains in 
the courts (Box-Steffensmeier 2013, Galanter 1974, Lazarus 2007).  
Given that actors strategically sign amici with other actors, what do we know about why 
amici submit to certain parties over others? Actors can submit in favor of the appellant, the 
appellee, or in support of neither. It is relatively uncommon for an interest group to submit a 
brief in favor of neither party; the overwhelming majority are submitted in favor of either the 
appellant or appellee (Ennis 1984). To this end, critics point out the fallacious nature of the title 
of “amicus curiae” as today they are no longer meant purely to support the Court (Banner 2003). 
In regard to whether an actor is likely to submit to either party and when, there is very little 
research exploring the causal chain that stimulates an amicus brief submission (Hansford 2004). 
Factors likely to increase amici submission rates are high complexity in a case, the inexperience 
of lawyers participating, and a relevant lack of information held by the justices. Hansford (2004) 
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further suggests that membership-based interest groups are more likely to submit when the case 
is likely to rule in their desired direction already. This research separates membership-based 
organizations from government-based groups in the motivating desires for submitting a brief. It 
suggests a disconnect between conclusions drawn from research on the behavior of membership-
based groups outside of that category. Further investigation is needed into the differing behaviors 
of actors as submitters of amicus briefs, and, ultimately, as lobbying forces within the Court. 
Ultimately, we care about the causal chain stimulating an amicus submission and the 
consequence of that submission. However, it is impossible to understand that inquiry without 
first pursuing a macro-level understanding of how certain interest groups, especially institutional 
ones, systematically submit. 
The Presence of Tribes, States, and Countries in the Courts  
Indigenous Tribes 
 Tribal nations are at the center of this research due to their unique quasi-sovereign state 
of existence within the United States’ borders. For hundreds of years, the dynamic between 
indigenous tribes within the United States and the United States government can be characterized 
as “an ongoing contest over sovereignty” (Wilkins and Lomawaima 2001, 5). Rather than two 
sovereign actors meeting on equal footing, the quasi-sovereign2 status that the Court projects on 
indigenous tribes complicates their interactions. Federal Indian law, or law analyzing the 
dynamics between indigenous tribes and the federal government, has a long and varied history. 
Indigenous tribes present a unique instance which lends well to comparison with both 
                                                      
2 I use the phrase “quasi-sovereignty” to highlight an actor’s incomplete self-governance. The “quasi” component of 
this sovereignty is a consequence of the dual-sovereign structure which the Supreme Court implemented in federal 
Indian law with cases at the beginning of the nineteenth century. These cases are discussed in the following 
paragraph. 
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independent nations and states within the United States. The research on federal Indian law 
focuses more on legal analysis than on understanding the patterns of interest group activity and 
there is minimal overlap between federal Indian law and amicus curiae research. Indigenous 
tribes are currently ignored within the literature on interest groups within the Court. The research 
that does exist analyzes only amicus briefs within cases concerning federal Indian law, with the 
unit of analysis as the case, rather than analyzing briefs regardless of case topic. By changing the 
scope of research to their briefs, we may learn more about indigenous tribes’ previously ignored 
lobbying tactics beyond cases focused only on federal Indian law. I provide an understanding of 
tribes as interest groups at-large, regardless of the range of case topics, rather than how they 
approach cases in a single area of the law. 
 I first supply a limited overview of the presence of indigenous tribes within the Court 
over the past two centuries with an emphasis on the ever-changing status of tribal sovereignty. 
Three cases at the turn of the nineteenth century, colloquially known as the Marshall Trilogy 
(Fletcher 2015), solidified the Court’s stance on tribes’ sovereignty for over a century. These 
cases, Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831), 
and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) enacted the Doctrine of Discovery and set the 
relationship between states and indigenous tribes in the “dual sovereign structure” that remains 
today. The Doctrine of Discovery recognized the “discovering” and colonizing of North America 
as evidence that the United States government rightfully holds the power and reigns supreme 
over tribal nations but still independently recognized a degree of autonomy of indigenous tribes 
(Wildenthal 2003).  
The twentieth century brought significant changes. Implicit divestiture is at the root of 
many cases regarding tribal sovereignty (LaVelle 2006, 732). This concept was first utilized in 
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Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe in Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion (Oliphant v. 
Squamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). He held that, over an extended period of time, 
tribes had implicitly relinquished their sovereign status to the United States government and thus 
lost possession of their sovereignty in criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands (Wildenthal 2003, 73). 
Until 1978, tribes retained authority unless explicitly divested of such authority by Congress 
(Duthu 1994). In ruling that power could be implicitly divested by tribes, the Courts widened the 
jurisdiction of the Courts in regard to tribal sovereignty, instituting the equivalent of a seizure of 
judicial review on par with Marbury v. Madison. Whether or not the Court intended to widen the 
tribal caseload within its docket, the diagnosis which Oliphant gave lends a dynamic, ever-
changing relationship between tribes and the United States, and forces tribe after tribe back 
towards the Supreme Court in an attempt to elucidate the confusing parameters of Oliphant's 
curtailed view of indigenous sovereignty (Duthu 1994). The basis for Rehnquist's ruling 
stemmed from tribes’ "dependent status," and was largely an attempt to prevent tribes from 
receiving too much political autonomy (United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 326 (1978); Bruce 
1994). Oliphant remains largely still in function today in spite of several cases attempting to 
repair the damage caused by this decision (Duro v. Reina (1990)). While there are many cases 
that contributed to shifts in tribal rights within the Supreme Court’s history, the Court’s 
treatment of indigenous tribes in the beginning of its tenure with the Marshall Trilogy and in the 
modern age with Oliphant help to frame the “quasi-” portion of the quasi-sovereignty possessed 
by indigenous tribes. 
The development of the Tribal Supreme Court Project (“Project”) demonstrates a clear 
recognition of the importance of the Supreme Court’s decisions on tribal sovereignty and the role 
amici play in those decisions. In response to a series of cases at the turn of the twenty-first 
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century that encroached on tribal sovereignty, the National Congress of American Indians 
(NCAI) and the Native American Rights Fund (NARD) founded the Project (Guest 2011, 2). The 
Project, mirroring the States’ Supreme Court Project, developed into an institution focused on 
paying close attention to cases relevant to indigenous tribes moving through the channels 
towards the Court and coordinating collective action in those cases (Labin 2002, 696). Their 
work focuses particularly on amici coordination (Guest 2017, 29; Fletcher 2013, 45). The 
creation of an entire institution focusing on coordinating indigenous tribes’ presences in the 
Court upholds the intentional nature that I argue structure the submission of indigenous tribes’ 
briefs. 
Any existing research that involves the amici of indigenous tribes focuses more on 
federal Indian law than on the amici and their submitters. Pommersheim (2011) focuses on the 
arguments made by all submitters of amicus briefs in federal Indian law. In the majority of cases 
evaluated in this study, states and indigenous tribes are on opposing party sides. However, 
Pommersheim notes that the Justice Department frequently submits amici in favor of tribes, 
barring instances in which the federal government is a party in opposition to the tribe, and credits 
the “deeply entwined historical and contemporary relationship” between the United States 
federal government and indigenous tribes as the cause of this dynamic. The Justice Department’s 
frequent submission in favor of indigenous tribes suggests that the federal government is not 
completely at odds with the interests of indigenous tribes. The relationship between the federal 
government and indigenous tribes is complicated and occasionally clashes, but also does not 
prevent sporadic cooperation or agreement on legal interpretations.  
Fletcher (2013) also analyzed amici submitted in federal Indian law and posits several 
guidelines for actors seeking to make contributions to such cases. Fletcher conducted qualitative 
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analysis of amicus brief content and general success of amicus curiae in specific cases. This 
work focuses more on evaluating which types of amicus briefs are preferred by the Court rather 
than observing indigenous tribes’ behavior as submitters. He characterizes successful briefs as 
capable of utilizing the institutional dynamics between tribes, private interests, and the federal 
government in favor of tribal interest should amici submitters intentionally and effectively 
structure their argument and orchestrate their submissions. Fletcher labels tribal interests as a 
growing area of litigation within the Supreme Court and calls for further research into how 
submitters intentionally frame and shape cases. 
In regard to the procedure for amici submissions, an important difference to note is that 
actors representing portions of the United States government are given special treatment which 
other sovereign actors, such as tribes and foreign countries, do not receive. Even before an amici 
crosses the desk of a clerk, the amici submissions of foreign countries and indigenous tribes are 
denied sovereign recognition by the constraints of Rule 37. McAllister (2010) argues that the 
Supreme Court’s Rule 37, which concerns amici submission protocol, prevents the equal 
treatment within the Court of sovereign entities such as indigenous tribes and foreign 
sovereigns. As compared to the United States, state, or even local governments, “Indian Tribes 
and foreign nations are treated less generously” within Rule 37.4 (McAllister 2010, 1). This 
“less generous” treatment is the requirement that, prior to submitting an amicus brief, all entities 
must have the approval of both parties involved in the case. Even though indigenous tribes and 
foreign sovereigns are government entities, they are not given the same privileges as United 
States government entities in their submission practices. The only briefs spared this impediment 
are the amici filed “on behalf of the United States by the Solicitor General; on behalf of any 
agency of the United States allowed by law to appear before this Court...; on behalf of a State, 
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Commonwealth, Territory or Possession when submitted by its Attorney General or on behalf of 
a city, county, Town or similar entity when submitted by its authorized legal office” (Legal 
Information Institute “Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States”). McAllister argues that 
the automatic acceptance of the amicus curiae of United States entities and the required 
submission and approval of the amicus curiae of foreign sovereigns amounts to “disparate 
treatment” and defies the importance of dignitary interests for tribes and foreign 
nations. Regardless of normative claims as to whether this difference in treatment is a 
miscarriage of justice, McAllister’s work shows the separate playing field made available to the 
United States, States, and local governments. This procedural disparity indicates that the Court 
unquestionably accepts the briefs of United States actors but does not do so for all other actors. 
While amicus briefs are not regularly denied, this process demonstrates the deference given to 
actors such as states. 
My brief history of the Court’s rulings on indigenous sovereignty and analysis of the 
limited research on tribes’ amici submissions underline the complex nature of the relationship of 
indigenous tribes and the courts. While my overarching research question focuses on indigenous 
tribes’ amici submission patterns as compared to states and foreign sovereigns, one first needs to 
understand the behavior of tribes independently. The gaps in the literature on indigenous tribes in 
the Court provide evidence that further descriptive analysis is needed in order to understand the 
overarching patterns of behavior of tribes.  
States 
 
 States’ behavior as submitters of amici is already subject to serious evaluation. There is a 
wealth of research available on the presence of states in the Supreme Court. Unlike indigenous 
tribes, the current literature provides answers to the question, “how do states behave as 
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submitters of amicus curiae?” In general, states appear to have success in their presence as 
submitters (Kearney and Merrill 2000, 749). States’ regular presence in cases in front of the 
Court is an important differentiation from tribes and foreign sovereigns. In the final decade of the 
twentieth century, states submitted amici to 29.64% of all total cases (Kearney and Merrill 2000, 
753). In comparison to all submitters of amici within the Court, only the solicitor general submits 
as frequently as states (Morris 1986, 299). Although the solicitor general is the frequent point of 
comparison for states (Kearney and Merrill 2000; Morris 1986), it is not an adequate comparison 
due to the unique relationship between the solicitor general as an extension of the executive 
branch and the Supreme Court. States are more suitably compared to tribes and foreign nations 
due to their quasi-sovereign status as they are ultimately deferential to the United States 
Constitution but also possess their own constitutions that work in tandem with United States 
regulations. As no such research currently exists, I anticipate that my comparison of the behavior 
of tribes and foreign sovereigns with states will reveal a previously overlooked perspective of 
states’ behavior. 
 In spite of shifts in states’ amici submission behavior over the past few decades, the 
majority of research on the topic does not extend into the past decade. States’ submission 
patterns have changed considerably with the creation of the Supreme Court Project of the 
National Association of Attorneys General. At the end of the twentieth century, states began to 
notice the potential for growth as actors within the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court 
Project were founded in order to unify efforts before the Court and to “promote and coordinate 
the states’ amicus curiae activity on issues where there is a common state interest” (Swinford and 
Waltenburg 1999, 249). The Supreme Court Project represents the beginning of a significant 
increase in state attorneys general amici coordination habits (Gleason 2017, 25), and laid the 
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groundwork for foundation of the Tribal Supreme Court Project in 2002. States’ amici-
submitting behavior is meaningful because of their tactical, goal-oriented nature; the amici 
coordination that grew from the Supreme Court Project supports the depiction of amici in this 
light. Additionally, the recent beginning of this shift in coordination efforts solidifies the 
importance of consistent research charting the current behavior of institutional actors – my 
research fills a void in large-scale descriptive analyses of states’ behavior over the past decade. 
 Why certain states submit with whom they do and to which side they do is a seemingly 
logistical yet deeply important question that has only recently been broached (Provost 2011). 
Provost’s findings further the conception of amicus curiae submissions as tactical decision-
making. In examining why states submit when they do, evidence suggests that attorneys general 
are more likely to sign on to amicus curiae when there is an opportunity to advance their own 
“policy making and electoral goals” (Provost 2011, 22). This supports the assumption that amici 
are intentionally submitted not just to help the Court, or even the party to whom an amicus brief 
is submitted. One step further, a state’s amicus brief is also an attempt to position itself or its 
leaders in a favorable light, either by achieving the outcomes desired or by providing an 
outwardly visible display of effort on the part of institutional leaders. The importance of being 
seen helping highlights the electoral component for states: attorneys general seeking reelection 
can use amicus submissions as examples of actively pursuing constituents’ desires at the national 
level.  This conception of amici as visible evidence of an attorney general’s efforts is unique to 
states. 
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Foreign Sovereigns 
In his recent book, The Court and the World, Justice Breyer emphasizes the inherently 
domestic nature of the Supreme Court. There is not, he says, a "Supreme Court of the World 
with power to harmonize differences among the approaches of different nations" (Breyer 2016). 
At most, the Supreme Court may act as a mediator between international law and its applications 
and implications for the United States Constitution (Bradley 2016). However, Breyer emphasizes 
the importance of learning about and drawing from other sovereign nations' systems of law as a 
means of listening to the "many voices" of foreign governments. The presence of foreign nations 
within the Court is a contentious topic. Justice Thomas cautions against imposing “foreign 
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans” (537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J. concurring in 
denial of certiorari). 
Justice Breyer and Justice Thomas’ statements show a glimpse of the growing normative 
debate regarding the proper interaction with and participation of foreign sovereigns within the 
Supreme Court. Within the past decade a growing body of research has evaluated the interaction 
of foreign countries in the Court through their amicus curiae (Godi 2017). Amicus curiae expand 
the Court’s understanding of a case’s ramifications throughout and beyond the United 
States. Although the Supreme Court is inherently a domestic court, there is frequent, necessary 
interaction of foreign sovereigns. Amicus briefs represent a significant portion of the Court’s 
interaction with these sovereigns. Comparing the behavior of amicus curiae between indigenous 
tribes and foreign sovereigns builds an understanding, which the current literature has not yet 
produced, of the differing manifestations of amicus curiae influence and how different sovereign 
actors wield this influence.  
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A change in submission protocol for sovereigns submitting amicus briefs occurred in 
1978. Before this point, foreign sovereigns either formally submitted amici or submitted 
statements to the U.S. Department of State, who would communicate necessary sentiments to the 
Court. This change emphasizes the solidification of the adjudicative, rather than diplomatic, role 
of the Court even when interacting with foreign sovereigns (Martyniszyn 2016, 617). Beyond 
mere procedural implications, this change is important as it shifted the executive branch away 
from the role of the middleman between foreign sovereigns and the Court. This movement 
facilitated, for the first time, regular and direct contact between foreign sovereigns and the 
judicial branch (Eichensehr 2016, 300).  
Plass (1995) writes on the “futility” of international amicus briefs. This work took a case 
study approach qualitatively examining foreign sovereigns’ briefs individually. Plass concludes 
that domestic amici are more likely to sway the Court, and that foreign amici are “doomed to a 
response of indifference” (Plass 1995, 1228). Although Plass’ work is important as it emphasizes 
the unique role of foreign sovereigns as submitters in the United States’ highest domestic court, 
his work theorizes rather than evaluates the strategic behavior of foreign amici. 
Eichensehr’s (2016) descriptive account of foreign sovereigns’ amici participation was 
the first quantitative research on the topic and provided evidence in stark contrast with Plass’ 
qualitative assumptions. Eichensehr’s dataset includes all amicus briefs submitted by foreign 
sovereigns to the Court for cases on the merits from 1978 – 2013. She evaluates submitter 
behavior and notes factors such as the rate of filing, the types of cases in which foreign sovereign 
amici file, and the type of arguments made (Eichensehr 2016, 312). This research is unique in the 
attention paid to the behavior of amici, or “who files, when they file, how they file, and how they 
influence the Court” (Eichensehr 2016). Additionally, Eichensehr breaks away from Plass’ 
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perspective on foreign sovereigns’ amici; she finds significant reference to foreign sovereigns’ 
amicus briefs by the Court and frames this as “evidence - though imperfect – of the influence 
foreign sovereign amici have on the Court” (Eichensehr 2016, 319). As citation-rate is the 
currently accepted metric for measuring an amici’s effect, this suggests that foreign nations’ 
amici carry significant weight with the justices. The sharp juxtaposition of Eichensehr’s 
quantitative findings with the previously exclusively qualitative research on foreign sovereigns’ 
amici underlines the importance of providing descriptive accounts of actors’ behavior. While the 
data she gathers is impressive, it lacks the full context of a comparison with fellow submitters of 
amicus briefs. A comparison of foreign sovereigns and indigenous tribes as submitters is of 
interest as it will extend the understanding of how foreign sovereigns involve themselves in the 
Supreme Court.  
How the Actors Submit Amici 
 In spite of literature on the general presences of indigenous tribes, states, and foreign 
sovereigns within the Court, the disparity in research on indigenous tribes is clear as my analysis 
narrows on amicus curiae. The implications of this disparity are myriad. Research on amicus 
submissions allow for an understanding of how interest groups envision their own role within the 
judicial branch. Without knowing more about the activity of a variety of interest group types it is 
impossible to draw meaningful conclusions about why groups interact with the Court in certain 
ways and how certain groups impact the Court more than others. Even the comparatively robust 
understanding of states’ submissions is less meaningful without the context of foreign sovereigns 
and indigenous tribes as there is no framework of comparison with which to understand whether 
states act as they do because of their degree of legal autonomy from the Court or because of their 
constitutionally-induced dependency on the Court. I analyze the current understanding, or lack 
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thereof, of how frequently these actors submit, to which party they submit, and with whom they 
submit. Where there are gaps, I offer theories for how each actor may approach their submissions 
based on their prior history of activity within the Court at-large. These theories form the basis of 
my hypotheses in the subsequent section. 
Frequency of Amici Submissions 
 While there is evidence of how frequently states and foreign sovereigns submit amicus 
briefs there is no understanding of how regularly indigenous tribes submit briefs to cases before 
the Court. The frequency of amici submissions gives a general measurement of how regularly an 
actor type interacts with the Court; it is impossible to accurately measure the relevance of actor’s 
amici or amici effectiveness without first understanding the frequency of submission. A 
submission implies at the very least a willingness to contribute and to aid in the Court’s 
perspective as amicus briefs are voluntary contributions. One step further, amici represent an 
interest in effecting change in a case. As amici are investments of resources, an actor’s 
submission frequency implies the regularity of vested interest in the outcomes of cases in 
addition to a degree of expectation that the Court is willing to listen. Understanding the 
frequency of an actor’s submission builds the foundation for further measures of an actor’s 
behavior. In spite of the importance of this information, there is no research on the frequency of 
foreign sovereigns or indigenous tribes’ amici submissions over the past ten years. This presents 
a significant gap in our understanding of how regularly certain sovereign actors interact with the 
Court. 
States submit amicus briefs at a rate comparable only to the Solicitor General’s office; 
this high submission frequency indicates a regular presence within the Court akin to that of a 
“repeat player.” In 1982, states submitted 381 amicus curiae during the certiorari process and 
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684 on the merits. This amounts to over one thousand briefs in total. As compared to all other 
submitters this year, states submit more amici than any other single actor to cases both during the 
cert process and on the merits (Caldeira and Wright 1990, 794). These briefs necessitate a 
considerable amount of coordination as many are cosigned by multiple states. States’ high 
frequency of amici submission is in part stimulated by the constitutionally interwoven nature of 
states and the Court. Yet, despite the high submission rates of attorneys general in the Court, 
they are still unanimously viewed within the literature as “procedurally rational actors” 
(Waltenburg & Swinford 1999, 255). This means that states still intentionally gauge whether or 
not to submit an amicus brief and assuages the potential concern that a high quantity of briefs 
from states indicates submission with reckless abandon. The wealth of research on states’ amici 
submissions stops short of the past decade; while I do not anticipate a significant drop or spike, it 
is crucial to continue to remain watchful of the manner in which one of the biggest players in the 
Court approaches their amici submissions. 
Foreign sovereigns’ drastically lower submission frequency demonstrates the significant 
investment which amici require from actors not within the United States’ legal system. In her 
thirty-five-year period of analysis, Eichensehr collected only 68 amicus briefs from foreign 
sovereigns. This low submission rate dismisses arguments that states submit as frequently as they 
do simply because they are numerous – there are significantly more countries than states in the 
world. The difference in the quantity of amici submissions between states and foreign sovereigns 
indicates that the frequency of amici submissions is not merely a question of actor quantity, but 
also actor interest and investment. In a similar quantitative study of foreign sovereigns’ amicus 
brief submissions, Martyniszyn (2016) compiled a complete list of foreign amici submissions in 
U.S. antitrust cases at the District Court, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court levels. 
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Martyniszyn finds that developed nations make up the majority of foreign sovereigns’ amicus 
submissions and that nations submit amici out of a desire to “protect their prerogatives.” 
(Martyniszyn 2016, 642). Given the considerable undertaking and coordination which amici 
necessitate, it is unsurprising that developed nations participate more frequently. Developed 
nations are more likely to have the flexibility to invest time and resources into creating an amici. 
The high frequency of developed nations demonstrates the importance of either familiarity with 
the United States judicial system or the means to obtain counsel with such familiarity. Foreign 
sovereigns’ amici submissions, while not robust enough in the past as to allow for significantly 
generalizable conclusions, lend a critical framework of comparison for attempting to estimate the 
submission behavior of indigenous tribes. 
The absence of literature on indigenous tribes’ amici leaves no conception of submission 
quantity; however, I anticipate that the quasi-sovereign nature of indigenous tribes plays a key 
role in their amicus submission frequency. On a continuum of quasi-sovereignty, states and 
foreign sovereigns are on opposite ends. States are significantly beholden to the rulings of the 
Supreme Court and frequently submit amicus briefs as there are regularly cases which directly 
affect states and their interests. Foreign sovereigns, on the other side of the spectrum, are 
comparatively less directly impacted by the Supreme Court’s rulings and, thus, are less 
frequently motivated to write amici. While caught in between, indigenous tribes are invested in 
United States policy at a level more akin to a foreign sovereign than a state (Duthu 1994, 401; 
Coffey and Tsotsie 2001, 192; Gould 1996, 837; Dussias 1993, 78; Porter 1997). The precarious 
balance of needing communication with the federal government while also wanting sovereignty 
leads to a fluctuating relationship in which, I estimate, tribes enter the Court at a frequency 
higher than foreign sovereigns but significantly lower than states. 
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To Whom Amici Are Submitted 
 Submitting briefs to either the petitioner or the defendant at disparate rates showcases 
actors’ efforts to make amicus briefs cost-effective. Given that actors choose when to submit 
amici strategically, the likelihood of a party’s success is a key determinant in when an actor will 
invest the resources in an amicus submission. A case more likely to win before the Supreme 
Court could be seen as a better investment for actors looking to strategically yet sparingly submit 
their amici. Petitioners are overwhelmingly more successful before the Court (Provine 1980, 41; 
Kearney and Merrill 2000, 790); previous research indicates that respondents only succeed 33% 
of the time (Segal 1988, 140). Additionally, petitioners receive more amicus curiae briefs 
(Kearney and Merrill 2000, 793).  In light of the large difference in success rates for either party, 
I contend that an actor’s significant difference in submission rate to the petitioner or respondent 
demonstrates an effort to make a brief more cost-effective. If an actor submits more regularly to 
the petitioner, they are likely attempting to capitalize on the already-favored stance of the 
petitioner before the Court and view respondents’ cases as lost causes. In an opposing vein of 
logic, an actor submitting more regularly to a respondent may be trying to help make up for the 
disadvantage of the underdog respondent. I suggest that actors trying to submit more cost-
effectively utilize the former strategy. There is not currently any literature discussing whether or 
not any of my actors submit more regularly to a petitioner or a respondent; nevertheless, I 
analyze the significant research on the frequency and effectiveness of amici from states and 
foreign sovereigns as to anticipate the party to whom each actor will submit. 
Although there is no literature on whether states and foreign sovereigns submit to either 
petitioners or respondents more often, the difference between the actors’ abilities to invest in 
amici indicates whether they are likely to submit to a petitioner or a respondent. Previous 
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research supports the assertion that certain groups submit amici based on when is most “cost-
effective” for an actor type (Caldeira and Wright 1990, 795). This argument portrays member 
interest groups’ higher submissions to cases on the merits as due to the perception that amicus 
briefs are more effective at this stage. I extend this argument as to explain why foreign 
sovereigns are likely to view amici as more cost-effective when for the petitioner as there is 
already a likelihood of winning. States’ high rates of amicus brief submissions, established by 
Caldeira and Wright (1990), confirms the assumption that amici are not a difficult investment for 
the offices of attorneys general and that these actors have “fewer worries about keeping 
constituencies happy.” The offices of states’ attorneys general are increasingly well-funded 
(Clayton 1994, 538). A regular presence before the Court and largely unlimited funds enables 
states to submit amici with less concern for conserving resources. Amici are less cost-effective 
for actors such as foreign sovereigns. Foreign sovereigns’ low amicus brief submission 
frequency, established by Eichensehr (2016), indicates that they are more selective than states in 
deciding when to invest resources in amici and, I argue, will be more likely to submit when a 
case is worth the investment. The difference discussed between petitioner and respondent 
success rates suggests that a brief for the petitioner would constitute a worthier investment.  
I anticipate that limits on indigenous tribes’ resources necessitate cost-effective amici 
submissions on par with those of foreign sovereigns. This argument is in accordance with how 
often I expect indigenous tribes submit amici as I anticipate that tribal nations are more similar to 
foreign sovereigns due to the factors they prioritize in order to maximize amici effectiveness. 
Finding competent, affordable counsel in the United Stated legal system constitutes a significant 
impediment for indigenous tribes’ interest groups (Johnny 1991, 205). Furthermore, due to the 
quasi-sovereign status of indigenous tribes, there is significant oversight between the tribal 
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justice systems and the states in which they geographically reside as tribal courts struggle to 
work in the fluctuating jurisdiction lines drawn by the federal government (Deer 2004, 22). 
These obstacles suggest a significant difference between a tribal nation’s ability to invest in 
coordinating an amicus brief and a state’s. 
With Whom Amici Are Submitted 
 Instances of co-submission emphasize the extent to which an entity type coordinates 
amici with entities of different types, and, I argue, displays the amici network cohesion within an 
entity type. Frequent co-submission of amici with actors of the same type rather than different 
types would suggest the presence of regularly used amici-coordination mechanisms within an 
entity’s actor-type community.  In using the term network cohesion, I target the regularity with 
which actors coordinate amici within a network of their actor type. As I have previously argued, 
actors intentionally select their co-submitters; therefore, the decision to sign with actors of the 
same or different types is an intentional one. A significantly high or low rate of network 
cohesion, or the pattern of submitting with the same actor type, demonstrates an intentional 
decision to either remain connected to or break away from the implications which one’s actor 
type may have within the Court. In sum, the network cohesion of an actor type suggests how 
actors conceptualize the potential implications of their actor type in the Court. I anticipate that 
these implications rely on an institutional connection or pattern of success an actor has with the 
Supreme Court.  
 The literature on states’ amici formation suggests that there is substantial motivation for 
co-submission amongst states with few impetuses for co-submission with entities of different 
types. States’ intimate institutional connection with the Supreme Court and history of heightened 
success supports the assumption of high network cohesion. Gleason (2017) analyzed attorney 
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general coalition forming in amici submissions from 1980-2009 and their research upholds my 
illustration of states’ amici submissions as the product of intentional, dynamic coordination – 
amongst themselves. Furthermore, the more states there are signing on to a brief, the more likely 
a brief is to impact a case decision (Clayton 1994; Goelzhauser and Vouvalis 2013). This 
incentivizes states to coordinate amongst themselves as to heighten an amicus brief’s 
effectiveness. While the positive relationship between the quantity of states signing a brief and 
amici effectiveness does not necessarily de-incentivize co-submissions with entities of different 
types, I anticipate that states focus more on coordinating with one another and less on building 
amicus briefs with entities who may not directly help them. Gleason (2017, 27) highlights the 
importance of homophily in amicus coalition formation. This tendency towards homophily, or 
the preference for like-minded co-signers, presents an impediment to signing amici with entities 
of different types. While the desire for increased amici effectiveness provides motivation for 
states to find common ground with one another, no such incentive exists for states signing with 
actors of different types.  
The general infrequency of foreign sovereigns’ briefs would suggest low levels of regular 
amici submission coordination and, at best, a weakly constructed amici-submission network 
facilitating this coordination throughout the international community. This would be an example 
of low network cohesion in regard to amicus submissions. Foreign sovereigns’ lack the 
institutional connection that states do, as they are not bound to the United States constitution. 
Unlike states, there is no evidence that foreign sovereigns’ briefs increase in effectiveness 
through collective coordination. These two factors suggest that there is not much pull for 
countries to strategically align their views and coordinate briefs together. Furthermore, the 
already high effectiveness of foreign sovereigns’ solo amici submissions would suggest that they 
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do not feel as much of a drive to coordinate in order to further their impact. Foreign sovereigns 
are cited at exceptionally high rates which indicates that they are a desirable counterpart with 
whom to sign. Eichensehr (2016, 322) found that foreign sovereigns’ amici are cited even more 
than the Solicitor General. The high effectiveness of foreign sovereigns’ amici briefs and lack of 
clear institutional connection with one another indicates that foreign sovereigns are less prone to 
inter-entity type coordination and more likely than states to work with entities of a different type. 
 There is no understanding as to whether indigenous tribes are more likely to submit alone 
or in groups, yet tribal councils’ lack of leverage within the United States judicial system would 
indicate that they are likely to seek submissions with groups with more leverage. Indigenous 
tribes are not as institutionally connected to one another as states are; while there are 
conglomerations of tribal councils, there is no structured bureaucracy that allows for perfect 
syntheses of tribes’ governance systems and external systems (Becker 1997, 7). While this does 
not eliminate coordination, tribes are less likely to mirror states’ efficient and regular amici co-
submission patterns as they are not as institutionally tied to one another. There is neither an 
understanding of indigenous tribes’ amici effectiveness nor knowledge as to whether their amici 
effectiveness grows with coordination. The lack of evidence that indigenous tribes’ amici grow 
in impact with each indigenous signee suggests that there is not motivation for inter-council 
coordination of amici on par with states. Furthermore, interest groups with fewer resources 
desire to sign amici with actors with more resources (Gleason 2017; Caldeira and Weight 1988). 
Given indigenous tribes’ lack of resources on par with states, as evidenced in their desire for 
cost-effective amici strategies, they are a prime example of an actor likely to sign amicus briefs 
with groups with more leverage. 
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Throughout amicus curiae research there is very little attention paid to the networks of 
signers who frequently sign together, be they states, tribes, countries, or interest groups. My 
comparative analysis will aid contributions to this topic, in addition describing the broader 
patterns of sovereign actors within the United States Supreme Court. The literature defends 
several assertions that I make: amici are tactically and intentionally submitted; different interest 
groups have different behavior patterns as submitters; and these patterns of submission are 
significant as they impact the Court’s decisions. The differing levels of information available in 
regard to indigenous tribes, states, and foreign sovereigns as submitters of amicus curiae 
solidifies the importance of further investigation.  
Research Design 
My hypotheses on the manifestations of indigenous tribes’ submitting behavior as 
compared to states and foreign sovereigns stem from my discussion of the theory behind each 
actor’s focus while submitting amici. I anticipate that the motivating factor for states is affecting 
the maximum amount of change while indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns seek to 
contribute impactful yet cost-effective amici. Overall, I foresee that indigenous tribes utilize 
strategies more similar to foreign sovereigns than states.  
Hypotheses 
My research provides a descriptive account of the behavior of indigenous tribes, states, 
and foreign sovereigns as submitters of amicus curiae in the Supreme Court from 2008-2017. My 
first hypothesis focuses on the most basic measurement of amicus curiae behavior - amicus 
submission frequency. Different actors have historically submitted amicus curiae at significantly 
different rates. While indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns were not included in previous 
comparative studies of actors’ amicus submission quantities, I still anticipate the significant 
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frequency of submissions possessed by states to remain unparalleled. States are one of the largest 
actors in the Court. Given these conditions, I anticipate that indigenous and foreign sovereigns 
submit fewer total amicus curiae than states (H1). 
My second hypothesis focuses on the party to whom an actor submits as an indication of 
whether an actor is attempting to submit amici briefs in a cost-effective manner; I am attempting 
to identify the strategic nature behind amicus submissions. While amicus submission frequency 
indicates the regularity of an actor before the Court, it is only a small portion of an actor’s 
overall submission habits (Caldeira and Wright 1990). Petitioners and respondents have varying 
degrees of success before the Court; petitioners tend to be more successful when success is 
measured by achieving the party’s desired outcome from the Court (Segal 1988, 140; Provine 
1980, 41; Kearney and Merrill 2000, 790). In light of H1, I anticipate that as indigenous tribes 
and foreign sovereigns submit a lower quantity of briefs, they are inclined to choose which cases 
to submit to more strategically. I further expect that this strategy is to submit to cases which 
already have a higher chance of winning, as cases that are likely to lose could be seen as a waste 
of resources. As states submit an enormous quantity of briefs in general, I do not foresee a large 
disparity in submission rates in favor of petitioners, as this theory applies to actors attempting to 
strategically submit their amicus briefs and conserve resources. Consequently, I anticipate that 
indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns submit amicus briefs to a petitioner rather than a 
respondent at a higher rate than states (H2). 
My final hypothesis assesses the strategic manner in which an actor coordinates their co-
submitters on an amicus brief. The existence of repeat players (Bradley and Gardner 1985, 86) 
emphasizes the disparity in prestige between actors before the Court. Certain actors carry more 
prestige than others and have less need to partner with an actor of a different type. States are one 
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of the biggest repeat players in the Supreme Court (Morris 1987). Indigenous tribes and foreign 
sovereigns, on the other hand, submit so infrequently that they are not even separately 
categorized in previous research on actor behavior (Kearney and Merrill 2000). Furthermore, 
states are incentivized to coordinate with one another by the increase in effectiveness which each 
state lends to a brief; foreign sovereigns and indigenous tribes do not possess similar incentive. 
In light of this, I expect that Indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns cosign amicus briefs with 
an entity which is not of their own type at a higher rate than states (H3). 
 
Table 1: Dependent variable collection. 
Data Collection  
My dataset includes all amicus briefs from 2008-2017 signed by a state, indigenous tribe, 
or foreign sovereign. This amounts to 400 total briefs; in this dataset, the unit of analysis is each 
brief submitted by one or more of the actors. In order to ensure that every brief submitted by one 
of the actors was included, I examined every amicus curiae brief submitted to all cases on the 
merits before the Supreme Court from 2018, working backward. SCOTUSblog was a critical tool 
in the data-gathering process. I used LexisNexis and NexisU in order to gather details regarding 
cases which were missing from SCOTUSblog. I discuss my data collection process more in 
depth in Appendix A.  
The dataset discriminates in content as I only examine briefs submitted to cases on the 
merits. This decision follows the trend within research on amicus curiae coalition networks 
(Collins 2008, Box-Steffensmeier 2014; Hansford 2004; Eichensehr 2016, 304). The intent of 
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amicus curiae briefs at the certiorari stage is different than that for a case on the merits. Briefs at 
the certiorari stage are arguing for the Court to hear the case; briefs on the merits argue for the 
Court’s decision on a case (Cordray and Cordray 2008). By narrowing my scope to cases on the 
merits, I eliminate amicus curiae submissions with motivations significantly different from those 
which I project on to amicus curiae in my literature review. My research falls in line with recent 
efforts to further the understanding of the presence of amici in only cases on the merits, as 
previous research pays more attention to cases at cert (Solowiej and Collins 2009; Solberg and 
Waltenburg 2006).  
Dependent Variable Measurement  
Table 1 displays each dependent variable I examine, the corresponding hypotheses, and 
the coded variables within my dataset. I expand on the measurement of each variable and explain 
why I chose to measure the different capacities of each actor as I did. 
How often each actor type submits amicus briefs. I analyze “how often” by looking at the 
overall quantity of briefs submitted by each actor. In order to collect the total quantity of briefs 
from each actor, I coded each brief as either from a state, indigenous tribe, or foreign sovereign – 
I titled this quality “Entity_Type_Overall.” I coded states as 1s, indigenous tribes as 2s, and 
foreign sovereigns as 3s.  
I count a brief as from one of the three actors when the full, technical name of the actor 
itself (ex.: “Nex Perce Tribe,” “Alaska,” “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan”) appears as a signee 
on the brief. I count foreign sovereigns when the technical title of a nation appears on a brief; 
this does not include conglomerations of nations, such as the European Union, as I am interested 
in instances of direct submission from actors to the Supreme Court. I also did not include 
legislative bodies or governors from states – I focus on interactions in which the legal 
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representative of each actor is communicating to the Supreme Court. Although eliminating briefs 
signed by anyone other than the chief legal representative limited my dataset, my overarching 
intention was to isolate the connections between actors and the Court to allow for consistent 
comparisons across actor type.3  
While hand-coding each brief, I noted the overall entity type – whether the brief was that 
of an indigenous tribe, state, or foreign sovereign. I measure H1 by obtaining the frequency 
statistics for this variable. This simple method gives a clear depiction of the overall quantity of 
submission.  
To whom each actor type submits amicus briefs. I discuss “to whom” in whether an actor 
submits a brief to the petitioner or to the respondent. I chose this method as there is an 
unquestionable, readily supplied binary of petitioner or respondent that still carries significant 
meaning. Other methods of measurement do not as accurately get at the type of connection 
between the submitter and party to the case as the petitioner/respondent binary does; they instead 
focus more on the relationship between an amicus curiae submitter and certain case factors, such 
as the subject of a case, rather than the type of amici-party relationship. Even at the outset, 
amicus briefs differ in intention depending on whether they are looking to help either party: a 
petitioner is typically in an offensive stance; a respondent is in a defensive stance. There is a 
myriad of options for further narrowing analyses into to whom actors submit; future research 
could emphasize the type of actor to whom the independent variable is submitting instead of the 
type of party. I felt that due to the large scope of analysis of “behavior” that I am attempting, this 
                                                      
3 There were several instances of briefs in which states signed with either the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto 
Rico, or the U.S. Virgin Islands. I categorized these four actors as states, as definitionally and behaviorally they are 
more in line with the function that states play in the United States and have a similar degree of dependence on the 
federal government as states. While this is an imperfect solution, and there is a potential for further research 
examining these actors independently, these four actors, whom I label “federally deferential” on par with states, do 
not significantly interfere with my results as they a) submit at a low frequency and b) in my dataset they only submit 
alongside states, which further confirms the accuracy of my categorizing them as such.  
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research project was not best suited to approach defining and applying categories of actor types 
for this variable.  
I ran two tests of equal or given proportions in order to measure H2; one compared the 
difference between indigenous tribes and states and the latter compared foreign sovereigns and 
states. In the first test, I compared the significance of the difference between the proportion of 
indigenous tribes’ briefs submitted to the petitioner and the proportion of states’ briefs submitted 
to the petitioner. In the second test, I compared the significance of the difference between the 
proportion of foreign sovereigns’ briefs submitted to the petitioner and the proportion of states’ 
briefs submitted to the petitioner. I qualitatively compare indigenous tribes and foreign 
sovereigns following my discussion of my quantitative results. 
With whom each actor type submits amicus briefs. I address “with whom” in whether a 
brief includes entities of the same type – this was coded as binary. This measurement shows how 
frequently actors move from outside of the network of their own entity-type and work with 
others. By targeting “Multi-Entity” interaction within a brief rather than within a case, I gain a 
better understanding of the coordinated efforts that went into deciding with whom to submit. For 
instances in which indigenous tribes, states, or foreign sovereigns signed a brief with an entity of 
a type different from their own, I coded this instance as a “Multi-Entity” brief regardless of 
whether the different actor was one of the entity-types in which I am interested. To unpack this 
further, a brief was “Multi-Entity” when signed by one of my actors and another entity type, such 
as Alaska and the Governor of Alaska, or Alaska and Ireland. I only found one instance in which 
there were multiple of my entity types of interest (indigenous tribes, states, and foreign 
sovereigns) signing together (Brief for the National Congress of American Indians, et al. as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. __ (2016)). Multiple 
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indigenous tribes and states signed in this brief. I coded this instance separately and did not 
include it in the entity-type brief totals, as it clouds my ability to differentiate between the 
independent habits of each actor in its approach to the Court.4 This intentional framing of my 
definition of “Multi-Entity” for briefs allows me to examine amici coordination. The literature 
supports a differentiation between case and brief qualities as brief qualities tend to better analyze 
the “intensity of effort” (Caldeira and Wright 1990, 795). In observing the patterns of briefs as 
“Multi-Entity,” I target the intensity with which an actor is attempting to maximize the 
effectiveness of their amicus brief through intentional coordination.  
I measure H3 by running two tests of equal or given proportions, again with one between 
indigenous tribes and states and one between foreign sovereigns and states. The first test 
measures the significance of the difference between the proportion of indigenous tribes’ briefs 
submitted with another entity and the proportion of states’ briefs submitted with another entity. 
The second measures the difference significance in the proportion of foreign sovereigns’ briefs 
submitted with another entity and the proportion of states’ briefs submitted with another entity. 
Again, I qualitatively compare indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns after my discussion of 
my results as the low quantity of foreign sovereigns’ briefs precludes statistical evaluation. 
                                                      
4 Lewis v. Clarke had several briefs from both tribal nations and states. I included all briefs except for the one that 
included tribal nations and states as co-signees. This brief was signed by the National Congress of American 
Indians, Texas, Colorado, New Mexico, the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, the Navajo Nation, the Fort Belknap Indian 
Community, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, and the Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes. In this brief, the amici discuss the “government-to-government” basis in which they interact and convey their 
shared views on the case to the Court (Brief for the National Congress of American Indians, et al. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. __ (2016), 3). While a worthwhile focus for research discussing 
coordination between states and indigenous tribes, including this brief in my descriptive analyses of each actor’s 
distinct strategies would impinge on the comparative nature of my research question. 
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Results 
At the outset of this research, I sought to ascertain whether indigenous tribes are more 
similar to foreign sovereigns or states in their amici submitting behavior. My results demonstrate 
significant differences between the behaviors of indigenous tribes and those of states. I address 
the findings for each hypothesis in turn and discuss how my theory of each actor’s strategy is 
affected by the results.   
Frequency of Amici Submission 
 I hypothesized that indigenous tribes and sovereigns would submit fewer amicus briefs 
than states overall – this hypothesis is supported by my data. States’ briefs far outnumber those 
of indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns. From 2008-2017, states submitted 348 briefs, 
indigenous tribes submitted 37, and foreign sovereigns submitted 15. Figure 1 visualizes these 
results. The disparity in submission frequencies is substantial. 
 
Figure 1:  The total quantity of amicus briefs submitted to cases on the merits in the Supreme Court by each 
actor from 2008-2017. 
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My analytic intentions at the outset of this research were cut short due to the low number 
of briefs available from foreign sovereigns. The central limit theorem does not apply for a 
sample size of less than thirty, and this prevents an accurate estimation of the population 
standard deviation; therefore, my conclusions are statistically unreliable as they lack 
generalizable comparisons. In response to this conundrum, I qualitatively support my 
comparison of indigenous tribes to foreign sovereigns in amicus curiae submissions – I make this 
comparison in the discussion section following the rest of my hypotheses.  
The significant disparity in submission frequencies between indigenous tribes and states 
provides evidence that there are meaningful differences in the way that these actors approach the 
Court. There are myriad factors at work that could contribute to the drastic disparity in amicus 
curiae submission. As my literature review describes, there are inherent institutional differences 
between states, indigenous tribes, and sovereigns in spite of structural similarities which keep 
their comparison salient. For one, there are simply more cases in the Supreme Court which 
directly affect states. The actors’ significant dissimilarity in submission rates is shocking. 
Nevertheless, this difference neither elucidates why these actors approach submission at different 
rates nor precludes commonalities in submission behavior strategies. It does, however, confirm 
the existence of a significant difference in approaches to amicus submissions – comparing the 
quantity of briefs submitted lays the groundwork for understanding the grand-scale behavior of 
these three actors. In circling back to my original research question, the quantity of amicus curiae 
briefs submitted by indigenous tribes is significantly closer to that of foreign sovereigns than of 
states. The similarity in frequency of submission suggests that indigenous tribes and foreign 
sovereigns may approach strategies that determine the quantity of briefs they submit in a similar 
way. I posit that this is either due to similar approaches to their status of self-governance or a 
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common need to share resources. Nevertheless, this rate is a minute portion of the larger picture 
of describing the behavior of a submitter of amicus curiae. 
To Whom Actors Submit Amici 
 I anticipated that indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns submit a greater proportion of 
briefs to the petitioner than states do – this hypothesis was not upheld, but the relationship that I 
target is significant in the opposite direction. Figure 2 visualizes the observed proportions in my 
dataset. States submitted to the petitioner 48% of the time, indigenous tribes submitted 10.8% of 
the time, and countries submitted 26.7% of the time. Table 2 displays the raw totals for how 
often each actor type submitted to either party. 
 
Figure 2: The proportion of amicus briefs submitted to the petitioner by each of the actors. The delta symbol 
indicates a p-value of less than .05, representing a significant difference between actors’ proportions.  
 As there is no previous research on whether these actors submit more frequently to the 
petitioner or to the respondent, my findings are unique in displaying a significant difference 
between how often certain actors submit to either party. Yet, while the results are significant, 
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they contradict my theory of indigenous tribes’ strategy for choosing when to submit based on 
party advantage. As I predicted, there is little discernible difference in the proportion of states’ 
briefs submitted to either party. I argue that states are not as likely to consider the likelihood of 
an actor’s success when they are submitting – they do not need to be quite as intentional as they 
are such frequent submitters and have regular success within the Court. I formerly hypothesized 
that indigenous tribes would submit to petitioners at a high rate due to a higher likelihood that 
the party may win. This prediction stemmed from my portrayal of indigenous tribes as “cost-
effective” submitters, or submitters with fewer resources than wealthy actors such as states and, 
consequently, looking to conserve resources. Given that this theory, evidently, does not hold 
true, I adjust my explanation for this manifestation of indigenous tribes’ behavior while 
maintaining the principle that indigenous tribes submit in contexts which allow them to 
maximize impact while limiting costs. 
 
Table 2: The total quantity of briefs submitted by each actor type to each possible option.  
 In light of my updated reasoning as to why indigenous tribes submit to either party, I 
offer two alternative theories which could explain the significantly higher proportion of 
submissions to respondents. The first theory suggests that indigenous tribes’ behavior trends 
towards defensive tactics rather than offensive tactics within the Courts. This behavior is 
“defensive” in that by submitting to the respondent they are supporting the party attempting to 
prevent the Court from overturning a decision from the Court below. In discussing the growth of 
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the Tribal Supreme Court, Guest (2017, 30) described the brief in opposition as “perhaps the 
most important and effective brief filed with the Supreme Court” due to the critical role it plays 
in defending a decision favorable to tribal interests in the courts below. This view, expressed by 
a leader in the organization created to facilitate amicus briefs from indigenous tribes, highlights 
the emphasis placed on a defensive role within the Courts by tribal communities. Amicus briefs 
to respondents would be filed in support of the brief in opposition. Therefore, it is logical to 
assume that as the Tribal Supreme Court Project focuses on briefs in opposition, they also take 
great lengths to facilitate amicus briefs in favor of briefs in opposition. 
My second theory explaining the disproportionate submissions for respondents rests on a 
new interpretation of tribes’ cost-effective strategy; rather than submitting to the candidate more 
likely to win and striving not to waste a brief’s resources on a lost-cause case, indigenous tribes 
see briefs as more “cost-effective” if there is a belief that a brief will be more impactful. While 
Kearney and Merrill (1990) provide evidence that petitioners are more likely to win in the Court 
in general (790), they also suggest that amicus briefs evoke the most change when filed for the 
respondent (792). This measurement was based on whether the presence of amicus filings was 
correlated with higher than average success for the party to whom they were submitted. This new 
theory shifts the interpretation of indigenous tribes’ amici submission considerations from a 
question of “is this amicus likely to be submitted to a case that already has a chance of winning?” 
to a question of “is this amicus likely to resonate with the justices and does it have the potential 
to significantly impact a decision?” Ultimately, this conception of tribes’ submitting strategies 
makes sense when viewing amici as lobbying mechanisms, as a brief could be seen as more 
effective and worth the cost if there were a high-likelihood of its being impactful on the desired 
audience. This theory abandons considering cases with a lower chance of winning a waste of 
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resources and instead considers them a better investment of resources as there is a greater need to 
significantly change the outcome. 
My two new theories of amici submission considerations attempt to explain the 
statistically significant proportional disparity in to whom states and indigenous tribes submit 
amicus curiae briefs. While in an unexpected direction, the difference in proportions confirms 
my underlying argument that indigenous tribes and states employ distinct strategies when 
submitting briefs. This claim finds further support in my final hypothesis. 
With Whom Actors Submit Amici 
I hypothesized that indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns submitted with entities of a 
different type at a higher rate than states do – my evidence supports this hypothesis. Figure 3 
demonstrates the difference in proportions between the actors. States submit with entities of a 
different type 3.5% of the time, indigenous tribes do 62% of the time, and foreign sovereigns did 
not submit with any entities other than foreign sovereigns. The difference in proportions is 
statistically significant between states and indigenous tribes; states sign with other entities a 
minority of the time while indigenous tribes sign with other entities a majority of the time. 
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Figure 3: The proportion of amicus briefs submitted by each actor with an entity outside of their type. The 
delta symbol indicates a significant difference between actors’ proportions.  
Two different manifestations of a common effort induce this major behavioral difference 
between states and indigenous tribes: increasing the potential effectiveness of amici. For states, 
there is significant incentive to co-sign with other states as evidence suggests that briefs increase 
in effectiveness as more states that sign on (Clayton 1994; Goelzhauser and Vouvalis 2013). This 
is responsible for what I have previously labeled as high network cohesion within amici co-
signings. Amicus briefs are the result of communication throughout a network of possible 
signers; regularly co-signing with one another rather than with different entities suggests the 
presence of solid communication structures. These structures allow for consistent, coordinated 
contact. States’ amici increase in effectiveness as more states sign on – this provides substantial 
motivation for them to sign with one another. There is no impetus for states to open amici-
coordination networks with different types of actors. My evidence suggests that this incentive to 
work with one another precludes working with other groups the majority of the time. While it is 
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not clear whether states are explicitly de-incentivized to work outside of their actor type, the high 
rate at which states sign with only one another suggests that there are significant impeding 
factors.  
My findings also support my argument that indigenous tribes are placed in a starkly 
contrasting position of needing to coordinate with outside actor types as to maximize amici 
effectiveness. As interest groups with a less regular presence in the Court, I previously suggested 
that tribes are more likely to sign with entities of different types as to gain leverage through 
alignment with other groups’ prestige. While this theory is supported in research on lobbying 
tactics (Gleason 2017; Caldeira and Weight 1988), there has never previously been evidence of 
how indigenous tribes approach coordinating amici briefs. Indigenous tribes do not merely 
occasionally or sporadically seek to utilize connections with other actors – they do so an 
overwhelming majority of the time. This majority is made even more meaningful through its 
comparison to states – the significant disparity validates not just the presence of strategy, but that 
this strategy differs with actor-type. The evidence supporting H3 and my analysis thereof 
demonstrates the results of disparate strategies employed by states and indigenous tribes. While I 
have posited theories on the different tactics used by each actor and their probable sources, even 
just the evidence supporting how these two actors submit amicus curiae briefs in significant 
different manners is the first quantitative contribution on the topic. 
Qualitative Evaluation of Foreign Sovereigns 
In spite of the low power of foreign sovereigns’ briefs, they still provide a vital 
comparative tool for understanding the framework of indigenous tribes’ actions. Given that the 
low quantity of foreign sovereigns’ briefs does not allow for meaningful statistical assessment 
for H2 and H3, I now qualitatively analyze their presence and compare their behavior with 
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indigenous tribes and states in to whom they submit and with whom they submit. Throughout 
these analyses, I use Appendix B and Appendix C, which include all of the briefs submitted by 
indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns, respectively. 
In regard to the rate at which foreign sovereigns submit to either party, their behavior 
suggests that they, much like indigenous tribes, submit more to the respondent than to the 
petitioner. From this, I argue that they focus more on strategies of defending decisions already 
decided in favor of their interests than on submitting to a party based on higher likelihood of 
winning. While it may not be a statistically meaningful comparison that foreign sovereigns 
submit to respondents at a higher rate than states due to the low quantity of briefs available, 
foreign sovereigns did submit substantially more to respondents throughout the ten-year period 
that I examined. As with indigenous tribes, this disparity demonstrates that they tend to write 
amici in defense of a lower court’s decision rather than asking the Court to strike down a prior 
decision. Indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns both prefer the defensive brief, potentially 
because of greater impact that respondents’ briefs are known to have on the Court (Kearney and 
Merrill 792); this upholds my argument that foreign sovereigns seek to submit the most effective 
possible brief. 
With the low quantity of foreign sovereigns’ briefs, it is difficult to ascertain whether 
they submit with concern to which party (petitioner or defendant) or with concern for the type of 
actor. Foreign sovereigns file in favor of international actors in a majority of the cases in which 
they submit amici, and they submit to these international actors regardless of whether they are 
petitioner or respondent. Seven of the eleven total cases in which foreign sovereigns submitted 
briefs were submitted in favor of an international corporations, interest group, or individual 
(Morrison v. National Australia Bank 2010; Samantar v. Yousuf 2010; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
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Petroleum 2013; OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs 2015; Hernandez v. Mesa 2017; Jesner v. 
Arab Bank, PLC 2018; BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina 2014). Based on this evidence 
of their submissions in favor of international actors, foreign sovereigns invest resources in 
contributing amici briefs when there is direct involvement of international interests; it is possible 
that any correlation between actor type and the party to whom they submit says less about the 
strategy the actor uses when deciding to whom to submit and more about how regularly the 
actor’s interests appear in the role of the respondent.  
While states demonstrated a tendency to submit with one another and tribes regularly 
submitted alongside different entity types, foreign sovereigns appear to prefer to submit alone. 
Foreign sovereigns did not submit any briefs with entities other than foreign sovereigns, and only 
two of foreign sovereigns’ briefs had more than one signing entity. This directly contradicts my 
hypothesis that foreign sovereigns would, like indigenous tribes, submit more briefs with other 
entities than states. While my hypothesis was not correct for foreign sovereigns, the underlying 
theory is still in part supported. I argued that foreign sovereigns were more likely to sign with 
other entities than with one another due to low rates of regular communication on amicus briefs 
throughout networks of foreign sovereigns. This lack of an amici-submitting network is strongly 
supported – as only two of the fifteen briefs from foreign sovereigns were instances of co-
submission, there is quite definitely a lack of “network cohesion” in that there is no evidence of 
heavily-used channels facilitating amici coordination between foreign sovereigns. This is an 
important point of comparison for indigenous tribes, who regularly submit with different entity 
types. As I discussed in my results section, regular co-signing with entities of different types 
suggests indigenous tribes strive to boost their amicus briefs’ effectiveness and minimize costs. 
Foreign sovereigns’ lack of co-signing demonstrates no push to minimize resource costs in 
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addition to confidence in obtaining the attention of the Court. Foreign sovereigns’ positive 
outlook on their own effectiveness, deduced from their solo-submissions, is a critical point to 
emphasize when comparing their co-submission behavior with that of indigenous tribes. 
Indigenous tribes, as Appendix B displays, submitted all but five of their thirty-seven briefs with 
at least one other actor. Because neither actor submits with great regularity, the difference in co-
submission behavior exposes starkly contrasting strategies. I contend that indigenous tribes sign 
with other entities because they perceive a need for advantage; the lack of cross-entity 
submissions from foreign sovereigns solidifies indigenous tribes’ strategy as unique to their 
entity type. Foreign sovereigns’ differences with indigenous tribes may not be statistically 
significant, but they nevertheless provide context on how much of sovereigns’ actions are based 
on strategies unique to their entity type. 
Extensions into Social Network Analysis 
Social network analysis should be used in future research aimed at charting the dynamics 
amongst amici-submitters as to better understand the coordination of lobbying tactics before the 
Court. Throughout my research, I evaluate actors’ patterns of amicus curiae submission as to 
better understand the strategic behavior of actors within the Court – my preceding analyses 
indicate a wealth of meaningful differences in how actors of different entity types submit amicus 
curiae. As H3 demonstrates, there are significant differences in with whom actors of different 
types submit; this indicates ripe opportunities for further research addressing the “co-” 
submission aspect of amicus briefs. Targeting the dynamics of coordination between amicus 
curiae submitters would reveal more about how these actors approach one another while 
coordinating their briefs. By understanding the behavior of submitters in the creation of jointly-
filed amicus curiae briefs, we gain knowledge of the strategies of collective action used in 
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coordinating the lobbying efforts that are amicus briefs. Ultimately, understanding the extent of 
variation within amici-submitting networks, or how actors approach co-submission differently, 
would build a more complete understanding of how actors approach the Court.  
Amicus briefs are the result of months of coordination between signing actors; when 
instances of co-submission, amicus briefs represent a shared investment meant to promulgate a 
desired outcome. By signing on to an amicus brief, actors not only share the cost of resources 
needed to submit to the Court but also increase the weight of the words written by demonstrating 
an agreed upon, shared interest in the content of the brief. Borgatti (2009, 894) set out a typology 
of the different types of ties possible in social network analysis. These ties are the crux of why a 
social network functions and affects in the manner which it does – a tie can be based on 
similarities (spatial, membership, personal characteristics), social relations (mother, friend, 
cognitive), interactions (physical or intellectual), and flows (of physical or intellectual 
resources). In an instance of an amicus co-signing there is significant flow and interaction. For 
the interaction, actors actively discuss and co-sign this brief together. For the flow, there is 
sharing of belief in addition to a sharing of information as the amici work on creating the brief 
and agreeing on what the argument within the brief itself will say. A co-submission of an amicus 
brief is a relationship in which actors align themselves along a common interest, lending an 
argument in favor of either the petitioner or respondent, and it represents a collaboration through 
physical and intellectual means with the intent of evoking an impact on a decision before the 
Court. What does it mean to sign on to a brief with another actor? Most importantly, it is 
evidence of an intentional alignment of legal analyses and allocated resources. 
I argue that different patterns of co-submission, whether within an actor’s type or across 
different entity types, are particularly telling manifestations of actors’ lobbying tactics. 
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Submitting a brief with an entity of the same type emphasizes the commonality of a stance 
amongst institutions that already share interests and have comparable relationships with the 
Court. In coordinating within an entity type, there is an exchange of resources and knowledge 
between actors with some degree of similarity in knowledge and resources. For example, states’ 
attorneys general offices have comparable funding and bear equal constitutional obligations to 
the Court. On the other hand, submitting a brief with an entity of a different type may lead to 
more asymmetric exchanges of knowledge and resources. If certain actors seek to submit cost-
effectively, they may create situations in which there is an uneven flow of resources or 
knowledge amongst submitters. These different possible significances of co-submissions 
underline the importance of knowing more about the networks in which actors co-submit. Some 
entities, such as states, reap benefits when they sign with entities of the same type and are thus 
incentivized to do so (Clayton 1994; Goelzhauser and Vouvalis 2013). As my findings in H3 
support, entity types differ in the rate at which they submit outside of their entity type. The 
difference in rates for states and indigenous tribes are statistically significant and suggest that 
groups have unique reasons for deciding with whom to submit. However, before beginning to 
understand what co-submission tendencies indicate of actors’ lobbying tactics, more information 
is needed on the overall network composition of actors. Do coalition patterns appear within the 
networks of actors signing together? Are there different degrees of communication within a 
network, and does this result in certain actors becoming more desirable connections to possess? 
Do different networks value different manifestations of network power? These are a few of the 
many questions which my descriptive behavioral analysis of co-submissions give rise to. I 
propose future research should continue to first, evaluate the underlying tactics which foment co-
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submission behavior, and second, describe co-submission behavior across institutional actors of 
multiple types. 
I am most interested in the networks of signees that regularly write and submit briefs 
together and how these patterns of co-submission vary across different interest group types, 
representing different motivations for lobbying. Social network analysis is the approach best-
suited to target these relationships and my research has laid a conceptual framework with which 
to approach attributing meaning to connections between amicus submitters. There is currently 
limited social network research available tracing the behavior of states as signatories and, 
therefore, little evidence that provides answers as to why patterns occur between signers 
(Gleason 2017). Most scholars studying amicus curiae limit their research to analyzing brief 
content and effects rather than patterns and irregularities within submission rates. The number of 
signees on briefs has increased while amici submission has grown (Collins 2004, 811), and as a 
result the discussion of specific actors in the Supreme Court has shifted to one in which broader 
categories of actor networks are now examined. Rather than looking at the relationship between 
an amicus signer and a case outcome, increases in the quantity of signees on briefs shifts the lens 
of interest to the relationship between a network of signees and a case outcome. Without further 
understanding of the behavior of amici submitters within their brief-signing networks, amici 
effectiveness is increasingly difficult to isolate. Current research provides no understanding of 
which actors are at the center of coordinated amici submissions before the Court, and, 
accordingly, we have an incomplete understanding of the leveraging strategies used by states, or 
why certain actors’ presences or coordination efforts could carry more weight than others. SNA 
will expand perspectives within amicus research as it will enable further isolation of the 
consequences of an amicus brief. 
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Social network analysis adds a critical perspective in understanding how certain groups 
capture the attention of the Court and position themselves within the existing channels that 
facilitate amici signing. SNA is frequently used in order to analyze the structure of a network and 
the impact of this network structure on the function of its members (Hawe and Ghali 2007, 63). 
This is the necessary next step for research on amicus curiae. Social network theory frequently 
manifests itself in the social sciences with a focus on nodule consequences (Borgatti 2009, 894). 
I theorize that an actors’ role in an amicus submission network impacts the available options for 
connections with other actors, which in turn impacts whether their amicus briefs are effective 
enough to achieve their desired outcome. Social network analysis allows me to test this theory as 
it treats the actors as interdependent (Gleason 2017, Wasserman and Faust 1994, Snijders 2010). 
Better understanding amicus submission network structure will, long term, help us see how 
relationships between actors impact the effectiveness of their briefs. While amici effectiveness 
has always been a priority within the literature on amicus curiae, prior research has focused on 
amici effectiveness as products of specific actors rather than products of actors’ relationships. 
SNA will allow for deeper investigations into both the creation and impact of amicus curiae.  
Network analysis has only recently begun to intersect with the body of research on 
amicus submissions, and there is significant further research needed. Box-Steffensmeier (2013) 
applies network analysis in order to examine the degree to which the eigenvector centrality of an 
interest group correlated with the impact of their amicus briefs on the Court. Their use of 
eigenvector centrality underlines the importance of a node’s role in the amici-submission 
network overall. Whether an actor is connected to other well-connected actors matters. Box-
Steffensmeier’s research excludes states and foreign governments and isolates membership-
based organizations as the sole actors examined. While their work lays groundwork for future 
 55 
research attempting to conceptualize the importance of an edge between two amici signees, it is 
necessary to study institutional interest groups in order to gain a deeper understanding of how 
sovereign actors interact with the Court and impact judicial decision-making. Gleason (2017) 
employs social network analysis in their study of attorney general coalition forming and 
emphasizes states as particularly important amicus submitters to study due to their unique role in 
the United States’ system of federalism. Gleason, in line with Box-Steffensmeier, uses 
exponential random graph models, and evaluates actor attributes at the dyadic level, by 
measuring attorneys general ideological distance from one another, and at the individual level, 
by measuring the office budget of attorneys general. They find that the factors that increase an 
actor’s likelihood to participate in coalition formation with other states have changed over time 
(Gleason 2017, 21).  
There are currently no systematic, comparative evaluations of interest groups’ co-
submission behavior patterns. While previous research has focused on predicting interest groups’ 
amici behavior, there is no understanding of how coalition forming behavior varies across entity 
types. By looking at dyadic and individual attributes which increase actors’ propensity to form 
coalitions, we will learn more about the factors motivating interest groups to form coalitions. In 
future research, I aim to fill this void by evaluating whether the predictive determinants of 
coalition forming through amicus co-submission vary across institutional interest group types. 
This provides further opportunity to examine the puzzle at the center of my research: do 
indigenous tribes behave more like states or more like foreign sovereigns in their submission of 
amicus curiae before the Supreme Court? Within the context of social network analysis, my 
research question would transform to: do the factors which determine coalition formation for 
indigenous tribes more closely resemble those of states or foreign sovereigns?  
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I converted my dataset to allow for future social network analysis. My data were 
originally set up in a two-mode network with an edge representing a connection between an actor 
and the brief they are signing on to. For the preliminary SNA analyses I ran, I only evaluated 
states’ briefs as my data for indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns were limited. I first 
converted my two-mode network into a weighted, one-mode network in which each edge 
represented an instance of co-signing between two states. This logic is in line with the previous 
social network analysis conducted on amicus submissions – Gleason (2017, 15) also treated a co-
submission as a dyadic tie between a pair of attorneys general. Converting into a one-mode 
network allows for targeting the network of ties which result in the amicus briefs submitted by 
certain types of structurally equivalent actors. It is not the product being submitted, in this case 
an amicus brief, that piques interest. Rather, it is the effort of creating the product which I label 
as meaningful.  
Looking towards future extensions of my project, I intend to continue social network 
analyses.5 I would extend my dataset further back, ideally to 1968, to allow for more briefs from 
indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns. I would then convert these data into one-mode 
networks for indigenous tribes and foreign sovereigns respectively. In a manner similar to my 
current project, I would evaluate the actors’ networks individually and in a comparative context. 
In addition to measurements of centrality, I am interested in evaluating subgraph-based measures 
of groups. Isolating subgraphs will highlight the coalitions which occur in amicus signings 
within and between institutional interest groups. Ultimately, this is the necessary method to 
adopt in order to isolate amici submitter behavior; such research will solidify our understanding 
                                                      
5 I have been awarded a fellowship to attend the 2019 Political Networks Conference. This conference presents the 
opportunity to learn more about social networks analysis on the whole and to discuss ongoing social networks 
research in judicial politics. I anticipate that this opportunity will play a pivotal role in forming how I approach 
continuing this project in graduate school. 
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of interest groups’ lobbying tactics before the Court to an extent that descriptive analyses are 
unable to adequately target. My current research describes the behavior of institutional amicus 
curiae submitters and theorizes the motivating strategies behind amicus submitters’ behavioral 
considerations in their lobbying of the Court. My next step will be to analyze factors which 
impact coalition formation through social network analysis. 
Conclusion 
Closely examining how indigenous tribes coordinate amicus curiae submissions will 
better reveal how indigenous tribes view their own power within the Court. By charting 
differences in behavior based on actor-type, I lay the foundation for future work investigating 
how amici-submitting behavior indicates actors’ relationship with the Court, or how different 
actors pursue justice. In signing with actors of different types, indigenous tribes are in part 
acknowledging the limits of their persuasive powers before the Court. Prior to an actor deciding 
which tactical decision to make, the actor must have some understanding of the need for tactics. 
An actor’s self-perception within the Court targets whether or not an actor feels the Court is 
listening to them. This relationship has consequences in how an actor works within the Court’s 
channels and approaches the Court’s legitimacy. Ultimately, this logic leads to a question of 
whether different relationships with the Court amount to disparate judicial treatment.  
The act of compiling a dataset of all of the amicus briefs from indigenous tribes, states, 
and foreign sovereigns is a significant contribution to the field of amicus curiae research. There 
has been no prior understanding of the regularity of indigenous tribes submissions, let alone 
attempts to compile and describe patterns of their coordination behavior. Eichensehr (2016) was 
only recently the first to compile a dataset isolating all foreign sovereigns’ amicus briefs. I 
extensively further her dataset by adding foreign sovereigns’ amicus briefs from the past few 
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years. I provide original data on states’ submissions as there are few macro-level analyses of 
states’ behavior in the twenty-first century and none with data from the last five years. My data 
present a bird’s eye view of institutional interest groups’ amicus briefs in a manner that has never 
before been compiled. There are numerous qualities in my full dataset which my hypotheses do 
not address. This leaves a myriad of opportunities for further research.  
With the intention of fomenting future investigations into the unique relationships that 
institutional actors share with the Court, the descriptive analyses in this paper provide a 
foundational understanding of how different actors coordinate briefs and reveals, at the very 
least, the significantly different manners in which actors approach amici submissions. From the 
frequency of submission, to the party to whom they submit, to the actors with whom actors 
submit, indigenous tribes mirror neither states nor foreign sovereigns in their behavior before the 
Supreme Court; in their lobbying efforts as amicus curiae submitters, indigenous tribes are 
distinct. 
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Appendix A: Data Collection Process 
In order to capture every brief submitted by each of my actors, I accessed and opened 
every amicus brief submitted to the Court between 2008 and 2017 for cases on the merits. The 
SCOTUSblog website lists every case on the merits and includes a page with essential case 
citation details and a complete list of all briefs submitted to the Court for the case. These briefs 
are listed by primary signee and include a hyperlink to a copy of the full brief. I opened every 
brief to check for each signee, thus ensuring knowledge of every co-signer. I also confirmed that 
I captured all signees listed at the beginning and end of each brief – there is not complete 
consistency throughout submissions. 
Occasionally, there were missing links to briefs on SCOTUSblog. The farther back one 
goes, the more this occurs. SCOTUS blog loses consistency for cases prior to 2008. When there 
was a missing link to a brief on SCOTUSblog, I searched for the case on LexisNexis and 
confirmed that every brief and signee had been captured. 
As I accessed each brief, I coded a number of qualities relating to the case. The case 
name, case docket number, and lower circuit of origin are all basic descriptive case qualities that 
were noted for each brief. The number of total amicus briefs submitted to the case, dissent votes 
in the decision of the Court, and majority votes in the decision were also coded. The case 
decision of the Court was also noted. Finally, I noted whether there were briefs submitted to the 
case from more than one of the actors, such as a brief from states and one from indigenous tribes 
in the same case. 
Beyond case attributes, I coded for qualities unique to each brief as well. Most 
importantly, I noted whether a brief was submitted by a state, indigenous tribe, or foreign 
sovereign.  I clarified whether the brief was an instance of co-submission: this was coded in 
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noting whether the brief was submitted jointly in addition to noting the total number of co-
signing entities. I also coded for whether there were multiple entity types in the signers of the 
brief. Lastly, I noted whether the amicus brief was submitted on behalf of the petitioner, the 
respondent, or to neither.  
 The final, most expansive part of the dataset is a brief quality: the name and type of each 
entity signing on to the brief. Each signing entity was listed by name with the type immediately 
following (e.g., “Arkansas” in one column and “1” in the following column to indicate that 
Arkansas is a state, with “Mexico” and “3” in the two columns following to show that Mexico is 
a country). 
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Appendix B: Indigenous Tribes’ Briefs Collected, 2008-2017. 
 
Case Year Principle Signee 
*indicates co-submission 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number 
One v. Holder 
2008 Navajo Nation* 
United States v. Navajo Nation 2008 National Congress of American Indians* 
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation 
Council, et al. and Alaska v. Southeast Alaska 
Conservation Council, et al. 
2008 Nondalton Tribal Council* 
Carcieri v. Kempthorne 2008 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe* 
Carcieri v. Kempthorne 2008 Narragansett Indian Tribe 
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation 2010 Navajo Nation* 
Montana v. Wyoming and North Dakota 2010 Northern Cheyenne Tribe 
United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation 2010 Colorado River Indian Tribes* 
United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation 2010 Osaga Nation 
Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter 2011 National Congress of American Indians* 
Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann 2012 Chickasaw Nation* 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 2012 Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians of the 
Agua Caliente Indian Reservation, California* 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 2012 Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians* 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 2012 Inter Tribe Counsel of Arizona* 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 2012 Seminole Nation of Oklahoma 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 2012 Association of American Indian Affairs* 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 2012 Lower Sioux Indian Community* 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 2012 Seminole Tribe of Florida* 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 2012 Navajo Nation 
Shelby County v. Holder 2012 Alaska Federation of Natives* 
Shelby County v. Holder 2012 Navajo Nation* 
Michigan v. Bays Mills Indian Community 2013 National Congress of American Indians* 
Michigan v. Bays Mills Indian Community 2013 Lytton Rancheria* 
Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians 
2015 Navajo Nation* 
Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians 
2015 Cherokee Nation* 
Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians 
2015 Puyallup Tribe of Indians* 
Lewis v. Clarke 2016 National Congress of American Indians* 
Lewis v. Clarke 2016 Seminole Tribe of Florida* 
Lewis v. Clarke 2016 Pala Band of Mission Indians* 
Lewis v. Clarke 2016 Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians* 
Washington v. United States 2017 National Congress of American Indians* 
Washington v. United States 2017 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs 
Reservation of Oregon* 
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc. 2017 National Congress of American Indians* 
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren 2017 National Congress of American Indians* 
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren 2017 Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians* 
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren 2017 Cayuga Nation* 
Patchak v. Zinke 2017 National Congress of American Indians* 
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Appendix C: Foreign Sovereigns’ Briefs Collected. 
Case Year Signee(s) 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank 2009 France 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank 2009 Australia 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank 2009 United Kingdom 
Samantar v. Yousuf 2009 Saudi Arabia 
Arizona v. United States 2011 Mexico 
Minneci v. Pollard 2011 Mexico 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 2012 United Kingdom, 
Netherlands 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 2012 Germany 
BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina 2013 Ecuador 
OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs 2015 Netherlands, 
Switzerland 
Hernandez v. Mesa 2016 Mexico 
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado 2016 Mexico 
United States v. Microsoft Corp. 2017 United Kingdom 
United States v. Microsoft Corp. 2017 Ireland 
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC 2017 Jordan 
 
